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The General Aviation Revitalization Act 
THE GEMRAL A LTATIONREWTALIZATIONACT OF 1994: 
AN OW3RWE W OF TORT REFORM 
Alan J. Stolzer 
The aviation industry, not yet a century old, has developed into one of the most robust, visible, and analyzed 
industries in the world today. Despite its youth, aviation is a sizable industry, employing an estimated nearly 2.5 million 
people (NewMyer, Kaps & Sharp, 1997), and generating $75 billion of economic activity in the United States (Kane, 
1996). Its size, its importance in our society, and, unfortunately, the occasional mishap that occurs in aviation, cause the 
industry to be constantly in the public eye. One can hardly watch the evening news or read a newspaper and not be 
exposed to a story involving aviation. Ever present media coverage includes such topics as mergers, rightsizing, 
bankruptcy, new aircraft and technologes, economic news, crashes, near misses, and legal actions. The latter of these, 
legal actions, are not unique to the aviation industry, but one type of legal action, product liability claims against 
manuf-ers, were having a crippling effect on an important segment of aviation -- general aviation, according to Jack 
Olcott, president of the National Business Arcraft Association ("Statement of John W. Olcote," 1993). To address this 
phenomenon, the General Aviation Revitabation Act of 1994 (GARA) was signed into law on August 17,1994. GARA 
is a federal statute of repose designed to protect aircraft manufacturers from the uncertainties and costs associated with 
what has been termed "long tail" liability (Darwin, 1996). This paper will attempt to define the key terms, provide some 
background of the general aviation i n w  and the problem the law was designed to correct, explain the specifics of the 
law -- what it does and does not do, and consider the effect of the law since its passage nearly four years ago. 
DEFINITIONS 
general aviation -- generally referred to as all aviation 
activities with the exception of military and air carrier 
activity (Kane, 19%). A general aviation aircraft is an 
aircraft: (1) for which the FAA @xiera1 Aviation 
Administration] has issued a type or airworthiness 
cdficate; (2) which carries fewer than 20 passengers; 
and (3) which is not engaged in scheduled passenger 
carrying operations (General Aviation Revitalization 
Act of 1994). 
joint and several liability -- A liability is said to be joint and 
several when the creditor may sue one or more of the 
parties to such liability separately, or all of them 
together at his option (Black, 1983). 
product liability -- refers to the legal liability of 
manufacturers and sellers to compensate buyers, users, 
and even bystanders, for damages or injuries suEered 
because of defects in goods purchased. A tort which 
makes a manufacturer liable if his product has a 
defective condition that makes it unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer (Black, 1983). 
statute of limitations -- A statute prescribing limitations to 
the right of action on certain described causes of action 
or criminal prosecutions; that is, declaring that no suit 
shall be maintained on such causes of action, nor any 
criminal charge be made, unless brought within a 
spdied period of time after the right accrued. Statutes 
of limitations are statutes of repose, and are such 
legislative enactments as prescnie the periods within 
which actions may be brought upon certain claims or 
within which certain rights may be enforced (Black, 
1983). 
statute of repose -- see 'statute of limitations' 
strict liability -- A concept applied by the courts in product 
liability cases in which a seller is liable for any and all 
defective or hazardous products which unduly threaten 
a consumer's personal safety (Black, 1983). In almost 
all states, a victim can hold a manufacturer or seller 
"strictly liable" if the plaintiff can prove that a defect in 
the product was a cause of his injuries, even if the 
injured person cannot prove neghgence by the 
manufacturer (Kolczynski, 1997). 
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tor-b- A private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of 
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in 
the form of an action for damages. Three elements of 
every tort action are: Existence of legal duty from 
defendant to plaintiff, breach of duty, and damage as 
proximate result (Black, 1983). 
BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM 
General aviation is widely regarded as an important industry 
in the United States. In 1991, following several years of 
industry decline, general aviation generated some $42 billion 
of economic activity, and employed more than 500,000 
people with wages of more than $14 billion per year (Wilbur 
Smith Associates as cited in Schrick, 1994). This sector of 
aviation includes business travel almost all flight training, 
business travel personal travel crop dusting, pipeline patrol, 
and so on (Kane, 1996). The aircraft used in general aviation 
are typically small aircraft in comparison to those used by air 
carriers. 
Twenty years ago, small aircraft were produced in 
abundance. In 1978, companies such as Cessna, Piper, Beech, 
Mooney and other U.S.-based aircraft manufacturers 
produced 17,8 1 1 airplanes. Sixteen years later the number 
produced had decreased by 95% to a mere 928 airplanes. The 
following table illustrates the production levels fiom 1970 to 
1997 (GAMA, 1997). 
Annual Shivmats of New U.S. Manufadurd 
General Aviation Aircraft bv Units Shivozd 
Year Units shipped Year Unib shipped 
What caused the dramatic decline in airplanes shipped 
beginning in the early 1980s? Opinions abound, but most 
agree that product liability played a major role. In a speech 
before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation, Jack Olcott, president of 
the National Business Aircraft Association, made the 
following statement ("Statement of John Olcott," 1993). 
First, we are today experiencing real financial and 
operational hardships as a result of this country's 
product liabrltty laws, hardships that have hobbled a 
once world-leading industry. Specifically, for us as 
aircraft operators, the cost of maintaining the aircraft 
we fly has risen substantially due to product liability 
awards and the cost of their legal defense. As a 
result, aircraft parts are, in many cases, much more 
expenswe or simply not available. Piper Aircraft, for 
example, which carries a long tail of liability 
exposure as a result of over 70 successful years of 
aircraft production, no longer is readily able to 
- 
supply parts for most of the more than 70,000 Piper 
aircraft sfill flymg. Cessna, Beech and others are 
similarly affected. 
Many people believe that the current aviation tort system was 
biased against the m a n u f a c m  for two simple reasons. First, 
manufacturers have been held liable for everythg they ever 
built. There were an estimated 181,34 1 active general aviation 
aircraft in 1996, and the average age of these aircraft was 28 
years old (1997 Statistical Databook). One can easily imagine 
the exposures the manufacturers have had to contend with 
because these older airplanes are still in service. Second, 
because of the joint and several liability laws of most states, 
a party found even 1% at fault can be forced to pay an entire 
judgment (Liability reform, 1997). This has led to aircraft 
manufacturers being named in numerous suits, and having to 
pay huge judgments, when their aircraft or components hardly 
played a role in the crash. 
OVERALL IMPACT OF TORTS 
Liability law is an mqmtant aspect of our legal system. Tbis 
law was intended to allow people with legitimate complaints 
access to the justice system to redress their grievances. 
Liability law, or tort law, affects society in many Werent 
ways, such as shaping public policy, determining the 
availability of products and services, and, ultimately, 
impacting the economy. 
Public Policy 
Tort law affects public policy in ways most people do not 
even consider. To give one example, as described by Victor 
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Schwartz, thirteen states allow a totally drunken person to 
recover damages in tort law. They allow people who misuse 
products to receive substantial awards. "Most Americans do 
not want to subsidize stupid behavior, but they do not know 
how this mysterious area of law works" (Schwartz, 1996). 
Products and Services 
There are countless examples of products that have been 
removed h m  the market, that never made it to the market at 
all, or that experienced substantial price increases as a result 
of product liability. Experts estimate that liability suits add 
$500 to new car prices, $100 to the price of a $200 football 
helmet, and $3,000 to the cost of a heart pacemaker. Also, 
Washington D.C. girl scouts must sell 87,000 boxes of 
cookies each year to pay for liabdity insurance. Finally, these 
experts note that Little League Baseball's liability costs 
increased 1,000% in only five years -- from $75 to nearly 
$800 per league annually (Legal reform, 1997). In the general 
aviation industry, a survey revealed that 47% of U.S. 
manufacturers withdrew their products £?om markets, 39% 
decided against introducing a new product, and 25% 
discontinued new product research -- all for liability reasons 
wane, 1996). 
Economy 
Liability suits cost the economy a substantial amount of 
money each year, although the exact figure is dBicult to 
determine. Some legal refom advocates calculate the cost to 
the economy as a whole from liability suits at $300 billion a 
year. ("Liability Reform", 1997). A more conservative figure 
is cited on the majority whip web page which states that 
America's 'tort tax' costs the economy $132 billion a year in 
litigation and higher insurance premiums because of lawsuit 
abuse (Legal reform, 1997). Whatever the actual figure, it is 
clear that these suits have a substantial negative impact on the 
nation's economy. 
NEGATIVE EFFECT OF LIABILITY ON GENERAL 
AVIATION 
While there are many negative effects of excessive liability, 
a few of the more important ones include the affect on 
insurance premiums, cost of aircraft, loss of jobs, the rise of 
foreign aircraft to dominance in the market, and the lack of 
research and development. 
Insurance Premiums 
Increased product liabilities have a number of negative 
@its, paramount of which is the increased cost of insurance 
and the resultant increase in the cost of the airplane. During 
the 1980s, liability claims paid by the industry increased from 
$24 d o n  to more than $2 10 million (Sullivan, 1996). Why 
did this happen? Michael P. Savin (1996), Claim Account 
Manager for Reliance National Insurance, offers the following 
opinion. 
As we are al l  aware, the plaintifs bar became more 
and more creative in their theories of liability, often 
looking to the "deep pocket" to fill their coffers. In 
the case of general aviation, that pocket was usually 
located in the pants of the manufacturer, such as 
Cessna, Prper Airaaft or Beech Aircraft. According 
to the plaintifs bar, every aviation loss, whether 
caused by failure of an uninsured component part, an 
act of God or just plain pilot error could be 
attributed to a design defect by the manufacturer. 
This was disastrous for the industry. Jury awards in 
excess of $10 million were all too common . . . The 
industry, which paid $24 million in premiums for 
the 14,000 aircraft delivered in 1979, paid $200 
million in 1993 when only 950 aircraft were 
delivered. 
Cost of Aircraft 
The increase in insurance premiums described above had a 
very predictable outcome -- the costs of the aircraft increased. 
Liabilay insurance added an average of 30% to the cost of the 
typical trainer aircraft as a result of the proliferation of 
product liability lawsuits (Cunnington, 1997). This increase 
in price made these aircraft unaffordable to many potential 
buyers. 
Loss of Jobs 
Another important affect of the decline of general aviation 
since the mid-1970s has been the substantial loss of jobs. 
Acun-dmg to induslry information, employment in the general 
aviation industry decreased by 65 percent. Cessna alone had 
cut employment fiom 18,000 to approximately 3,000 (Price, 
19%). Plper went fiwn 15,000 employees at its peak to 45 in 
199 1. AU told, over 100,000 manufacturing jobs were lost 
between 1976 and 1986, and an additional 15,000 to 20,000 
jobs were lost in related industries during the collapse of 
general aviation (Savin, 1996). 
Foreign Aircraft 
Foreign aircraft manufactmen capitalized on the opportunity 
to enter the U.S. market while the U.S. manufacturers either 
refused to produce aircraft, or were unable to sell them due to 
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high costs. For the most part, foreign manufacturers are not 
subject to the same onerous liability problems that U.S. 
manufacturers contend with. Manufacturers such as Zenaire, 
Hoarc GmbH, Diamond Aircraft Industries, Aerospatiale and 
others have increased their activity in the general aviation 
market in the past several years. 
Jack Olcott observed ("Statement of John W. Alcott," 1993), 
"Cessna, P i  and Beech used to produce a lion's share of the 
world's training market. Today, because of our product 
liability laws, France is now the leading supplier of training 
aircraft in the U.S." 
Research and Development 
One of the factors cited often as a negative affect of 
excessive liability costs is the lack of research and 
development occurring in the industry. Clearly, most of the 
investment into research and development ceased when the 
cost of liability insurance increased. Research and 
development was just beginning during that time fkame into 
such areas as Global Positioning Systems, composite 
cow&u&on, more intelligent cockpits, computer monitoring 
of engine systems, and others. As one observer (Stewart, 
1995) put it, "This has reduced the quality of the aircraft 
produced as well as the development of technologies within 
the aviation field" Drew Steketee, senior vice president of the 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, stated that when the 
production of piston-engine planes stalled in the U.S., 
research and development did too. "There's been almost no 
new technology introduced in piston-engine aircraft since the 
Piper Malibu in the early 80s," according to Steketee (Bremer, 
1995). Dave Franson, vice president for Cessna, stated 
(Bremer, 1995) that his company was spending as much 
defending itself in lawsuits in the mid-80s when it ceased 
production of light aircraft as it was spending on research and 
development This lack of investment was certainly illustrated 
in 1997 when Cessna produced its first model 172 aircraft in 
10 years, and it was substantially unchanged fiom the 
previous model. 
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS 
While many of the lawsuits against general aviation aircraft 
and component manufacturers are certady reasonable efforts 
to remedy legitimate complaints, some clearly do not fit that 
description. Following are some brief descriptions of several 
lawsuits many consider frivolous and inappropriate. 
A Piper airplane was involved in an accident due to 
maintenance problems. It crashed and caught on fire on 
the side of the road. A lady stopped to see the fire, and 
when she stopped, someone hit her ffom behind. She 
sued Piper simply because Piper had 'created' a nuisance 
on the side of the road and made her stop. The case was 
thrown out of court, but it still cost Piper $100,000 in 
legal expenses (Cunnington, 1997). 
A Piper aircraft was used in the making of a movie. The pilot 
was doing the filming while seated backward in the 
plane. The plane crashed and the pilot sued Piper on the 
grounds that it made an unsafe airplane with poor 
backseat visibility (Sullivan, 1996). A $2.5 million 
judgment was made in favor of the pilot. 
Cessna Aircraft was sued and paid thousands of dollars to a 
pilot who crashed his Cessna 195 due to water in a fuel 
tank. The airplane had been parked outside during four 
days of very heavy Florida rains, and had failed to use the 
wing tank drains to remove the water fkom the tanks 
("Statement of John W. Olcott," 1993). 
o A pilot crashed an illegally overloaded two-seat training 
aircraft into a building at an airport. A third occupant of 
the airplane, a small boy not seated in a seat with a 
restraint belt, sustained a brain injury when he was 
thrown through the windshield and struck his head on a 
steel beam inside the building. The pilot defaulted on a 
$750,000 judgment against hm, so Cessna was sued and a 
ordered to pay $1 million to the injured boy ("Statement 
of John W. Olcott," 1993). 
n Unison Industries, makers of aircraft ignition systems, 
incurred $10,000 in legal expenses clearing its name in 
a Hawaii crash case where its product was not even on 
the aircraft ("Statement of John W. Olcott," 1993). 
Piper spent nearly $1 million in legal fees to defend itself 
in a crash case where the pilot of a Super Cub tested 
positive for cocaine ("Statement of John W. Olcott," 
1993). 
Cessna and several component manufacturers were sued 
for $4.5 million in a case involving a drunken pilot. The 
pilot crashed an airplane after experiencing fuel 
exhaustion. Three hours after the crash, the pilot's blood 
alcohol level was 0.2%. The FAA allows a maximum of 
0.04%. The suit was settled for $50,000 following 4 
years of @tion ("Statement of John W. Olcott," 1993). 
THE ACT 
In the early 1980s, a concerted effort was begun to compel 
Congress to draft and pass a bdl to reform the tort law as it 
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applied to general aviation. The legal reform advocates felt 
that the bill should be based on a "statute of repose," a 
measure used to reduce the length of time a manufacturer 
could be held liable for defects. Predictably, the Association 
of Trail Lawyers of America opposed the legislation arguing 
that it would take away consumers' rights to seek redress for 
their grievances (JSane, 1996). 
Finally, Senator Nancy Kassebaum introduced the bdl on 
September 14, 1993, along with 51 co-sponsors (S. 1458, 
1993). The official title as introduced to the Senate was "A 
bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to establish 
time limitations on certain civil actions against aircraft 
manufacturers, and for other purposes." The short title as 
introduced was "General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993 " 
(changed to "... 1994" as enacted). 
The General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) effectively 
shields the manufacturers of aircraft and their component 
parts from liability lawsuits that arise more than 18 years after 
the aircraft (or part, component, or subassembly) is first 
manufactured and delivered to a customer (Darwin, 1996). 
(The full text of GARA is included as Appendix A.) GARA 
applies only to general aviation aircraft, and contains four 
express exceptions to its 18-year statute of repose. 
The manufacturer knowingly misrepresents or conceals 
certain safety information to or ffom the FAA; 
The claimant was a passenger for purposes of receiving 
medical or emergency treatment; 
The claimant who suffers harm was not aboard the aircraft at 
the time of the accident; and 
The claimant's cause of action is based on the manufacturers 
Written warranties. 
If the plaintiff is able to plead and prove any one of these 
exceptions, he or she can successfully avoid GARA's 
restrictions (Darwin, 1996). 
LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS OF BILL 
The bill was introduced on September 14, 1993, and was 
signed into law by the President on August 17, 1994 -- a 
relatively short time by legislative standards. It is particularly 
noteworthy that the bill was signed by President Clinton who 
had, upon taking office, vowed to veto any reform that crossed 
his desk (Boyer, 1996). 
The bill had 5 1 co-sponsors in the Senate, while the House 
version had 280 co-sponsors. In the end, 91 Senators voted 
for the bill. A synopsis of the progress of the bill through the 
U.S. Congress is contained in Appendix B (Thomas - U.S. 
Congress on the Internet, 1994). 
The amendments referenced above mainly centered on the 
limitation Mod. For example, the June 26, 1994, 'Engrossed 
House Amendment' version of the bill (S. 1458 EAH, 1994) 
provided for varying limitations periods depending on the 
item in question. 
(3) the term 'limitation period' means-- 
15 years with respect to piston-powered general 
aviation aircraft and the components, 
systems, subassemblies, and other parts of 
the aircraft, 
18 years with respect to turboprop-powered 
general aviation aircraft and the components, 
systems, subassemblies, and other parts of 
such aircraft, and 
22 years with respect to the other general aviation 
aircraft (including jet-powered general 
aviation aircraft) and the components, 
systems, subassemblies, and other parts of 
such aircraft, and 
An August 2, 1994, Senate amendment to the bill 
consolidated these varying time limitations into an 18 year 
limitation period for all three categories of general aviation 
aircraft. 
EFFECT OF THE ACT 
Since it became law less than 4 years ago, a detailed analysis 
of the effect of GAR4 would be difficult. Clearly, the general 
aviation industry is recovering, however, the amount of the 
recovery that is attributable to GARA is unknown. Following 
are same idonnation and data that may shed some light on the 
immediate impact of the law. 
"Thanks to GARA the general aviation industry is in better 
shape today than it has been at any time in well over a 
decade," states the General Aviation Manufacturers 
Association (GAMA, 1996). Employment has increased each 
year since GARA became law. In addition, as noted in the 
preceding table, the production of general aviation aircraft in 
the United States has also increased each year since GARA 
became law. GAMA (1996) states that the total increase in 
general aviation production since enactment is over 69%, and 
the production of single engine piston-powered aircraft has 
increased over 103%. 
The immediate effect on the manufacturers was signd5cant. 
Reports Reliance National Insurance Company, "At the time 
of its passage, GARA extinguished liability on 60% of all 
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general aviation aircraft ... a number which increases to over 
70% when only single engine aircraft are included" (Savin, 
1996). And, as each year passes and aircraft from the big 
production years of the 1970s and early 1980s fall under the 
protection of GARA, the exposure of manufacturers to 
liability lawsuits will decline even further. 
In a report to the President and Congress, The Results of the 
General Aviation Revitalization Act (1996), GAMA estimates 
that tens of thousands of new jobs will be created over the 
next ~e years as a result of GARA. According to the report, 
over 9,000 jobs have been created since 1994. Further, the 
report states that research and development has resumed in 
earnest, and optimism of the pilot community is improved 
dramaticaw. 
If not for GARA, the top two manufacturers of light general 
aviation aircraft would not be producing airplanes today. 
Russell Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO of Cessna Aircraft 
Company, stated, "The product liability environment 
practically killed an important segment of the aviation 
industry. The cost of defending lawsuit after lawsuit caused 
us, by 1986, to stop building piston-engine aircraft" ("The 
Results of the General Aviation Revitalization Act," 1996). 
Charles Suma, President and CEO of the New Piper Aircraft, 
concurs, "There is not a single company, government agency 
or individual ... that knows the sigdicance of GARA more 
than The New Piper Aircraft, Inc., and myself. If there is a 
doubt in anyone's mind of the effect of this landmark 
legislation, we are living proof. We are The New Piper 
because of GARA and its limiting effect on the enormous 
product liability tail" (Suma, 1996). 
David k o n ,  former FAA Administrator summed it up by 
stating, "There is widespread agreement that the General 
Aviation Revitalization Act is having its intended effect," 
("The Results of the General Aviation Revitalization Act," 
1996). 
CASE LAW SINCE GARA 
The effect of the courts on GARA has yet to be established. 
According to attorney Edward Booth, the first appellate 
decisions inteqmting GARA began appearing in 1996. Booth 
(1998) cites the following cases that involved GARA. 
Cartman v. Textron Lycoming. The plaintiff was injured in an 
aircraft accident in 1992. It was alleged that the plane 
crashed due to a faulty carburetor float installed in 1966. 
The plaintiffs allegations of a defective carburetor raised 
when an amended complaint was filed in 1995. The court 
ruled for the defendants. However, the court ruled that 
since the original complaint was filed before the 
enactment of GARA, the amendment does not "relate 
back." The court also ruled that the plaintiff did not 
sat& the "knowing misrepresentation or concealment" 
exception because the argument was not sufficiently 
specific in proving that the defendant concealed 
information fiom the FAA. 
Altseimerv. Bell Helicopter. A helicopter crashed due to 
a defective gearbox, which was manufactured more than 
18 years prior to the crash. Summary judgment was 
granted for defendants since the action was fded after 
GARA became law. 
o Alterv. Bell Helicopter. A helicopter crashed in a foreign 
country due to the alleged failure of an engine 
compressor stator vane. The helicopter and its engine 
were more than 18 years old. Plaintiffs argue for an 
exception to GARA due to the following: the 
maintenance manuals were issued within the 18 year 
limitation; the accident occurred in a foreign country; 
maintenance manuals were a "product" and that their 
issuance within the repose period recommenced the 
nmning of the statute of repose. The court rejected each 
of those arguments. 
o Rickert v. Mitsubishi. A 2 1 year old airplane crashed to 
due to alleged design defects and controllability issues. 
The court found in favor of the defendant, until it later 
discovered that the defendant had been less than 
forthcoming with its discovery process. The court will 
reconsider the motion of summary judgment. 
Wnght v. Bond-Air, Ltd. A 28 year old airplane crashed 
killing the plaintiff. The defendants sought to move the 
case to a federal court claiming that the action arises 
under federal law due to GARA. The court disagreed 
stating that GARA. does not confer federal jurisdiction 
upon state court claims, not does it create a federal cause 
of action. The case was remanded back to state court. 
ACT REFUTED 
In most complex issues there are differing opinions, and 
GARA is no exception There are some people who refute the 
impact of GARA and, to be sure, there are other factors 
involved in the revitalization of the industry. 
To quote Charles Suma (1996), "Today's marketplace and 
economy are substantially different than in the 1970s, when 
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this sector of General Aviation produced in excess of 145,000 
aircraft in 10 years. The majority of these are stiU in use 
today, worldwide." Suma contends that many factors are 
Werent now, such as: the loss of investment tax credits; the 
ehbation of the accelerated depreciation; insurance costs for 
owners, operators and manufacturers are substantially higher 
and do not track with inflation; fuel costs have escalated at a 
higher rate than inflation; the decline in middle-class 
consumers and their ability to purchase products; the cessation 
of the G.I. bill; the long life of the product; and the risk of 
over-production. These remarks were intended to describe the 
considerations manufacturers must take into account as they 
resume production, but one could also argue that these factors, 
all unfavorable toward aircraft production, led to the downturn 
in the industry. 
Some do not think GARA is responsible for the revitalization 
of the industry. One attorney who has studied the effect of 
GARA notes that small airplane prices have not dropped as 
the general aviation industry promised, because the industry 
has &ed no product liability 'savings' due to GARA ("The 
General Aviation Revitalization Act," 1998). In fact, a new 
Moaney single engine airplane that sold for % 165,000 in 1994 
is selling for $209,000 in 1997. A new Piper Saratoga that 
sold for $209,000 in 1991 is priced at $349,999 today. The 
same can be said for Cessna aircraft and those produced by 
other manufactims. On March 6,1997, the Subcommittee on 
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
held oversight hearings on the results of the GARA. As John 
Moore, Cessna's senior vice president, acknowledged before 
that Senate committee, Cessna has experienced no decrease in 
their product liability k m c e  costs. "Therefore, no cost 
savings have been passed along to consumers, as 
manufactures promised would occur," states Public Citizen 
("The General Aviation Revitalization Act," 1998). 
A writer (Clifford, 1994) for Chicago Lawyer newsletter 
believes that product liability is merely being made the 
scapegoat for mistakes the industry has made. According to 
Clifford, "The real culprit are the general aviation 
manufacturers themsehres who made questionable business 
judgments, having saturated the market with products that are 
built for a long life expectancy without adequately considering 
the safety consequences ... They did not face their day of 
reckoning when they had glutted the market while the new 
sales market had collapsed." CHord argued that reform 
would actually shift the burden of catastrophic injury and 
death to innocent victims and their families. Finally, he 
believes that the real issue for Congress to examine is that of 
liability insurance, contending that the insurance indusby uses 
exaggerated claims to justify rate increases. 
Public Citizen argues thaf contrary to popular belief, product 
habilrty litigation remains rare in this country and is not out of 
control. According to the National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC) (as cited in "The facts about product liability 
lawsuits," 1998), only .0036% of all civil case filings in state 
courts involve products liability suits. Further, a 1995 
collaborative study by the NCSC and the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice (as cited in "The 
facts about product liability lawsuits," 1998) reveals that 
products liabilrty suits comprise only about 3% of all civil jury 
trials. 
While acknowledging that there has been a modest increase 
in demand for small aircraft, some observers argue that this is 
a result of variables other than GARA. Replacement of aging 
air& and improved marketing efforts are cited by several as 
being the main reason for the increased production. Hal 
Wight, AAE., manager of airports for Contra Costa County, 
California, stated "Two of my flight training tenants are 
actually doing quite welL Both of them have had a pretty good 
turnaround I don't think it has anything to do with the product 
liability thing. I think the businesses, FBOs and airports have 
learned to sell their proctuct"' (Bremer, 1995). Wight predicted 
that there will not be a sales boom for new aircraft. He feels 
that even though it may be unpopular to say so, studies have 
shown there isn't a pent up demand for new general aviation 
aircraft. "The number of airplanes that are still in the fleet is 
stiU adequate for the number of people who want to fly," said 
Wight. (Bremer, 1995) 
Ollie Cramer, an airport manager at Manassas (Virginia) 
& arguing that the uptum in the economy has had more 
effect than anything product liability legislation did. "More 
people now have the money to start or complete their flight 
training," said Cramer (Bremer, 1995). 
CONCLUSION 
It is not diilicult to cite statistics that indicate that general 
aviation has experienced revitalization since the enactment of 
GARA. Production of aircraft is up, employment has 
increased, and there is strong evidence of si@cant research 
and development occurring in the industry. One could argue, 
though, that the turnaromd is based largely on the 
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expectations of what GARA will do as opposed to what it has 
done. The expectations of what GARA will do have changed 
the mood of the industry. After citing numerous statistics 
detailing the resurgence in the industry, David Burner, 
president of BF Goodrich Aerospace, said profoundly, "More 
importantly [than other factors], there is a strong conviction 
and determination that the general aviation industry is back on 
a growth track (Non-Hub, 1995). As stated in the The 
Results o f  the General Aviation Revitalization Act, "The 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), the world's 
largest pilot organization, reports optimism of the pilot 
comm* is better today than in recent history." A dramatic 
shift took place following the passage of the General Aviation 
Revitalization Act ("The Results of the General Aviation 
Revitalization Act," 1996). It is evident that GARA not only 
reformed tort law for general aviation, it also revived the 
optimism of those involved in the industry.n 
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APPENDIX A 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President)) 
--S. 145%- 
One Hundred Third Congress 
of the 
United States of America 
AT THE SECOND SESSION 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the twenty-fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four 
An Act 
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to establish time limitations on certain civil actions against aircraft manufacturers, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the 'General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994'. 
SEC. 2. TIME LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or 
damage to property arising out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the 
aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a 
manufacturer if the accident occurred-- 
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-- 
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the 
manufacturer; or 
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing such 
aircraft, or 
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced another component, system, 
subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, 
injury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition. 
(b) EXCEPTIONS- Subsection (a) does not apply-- 
(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to 
a type certificate or airworthiness c&cate for, or obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a 
component, system, subassembly, or other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation Administration, 
or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration, required information that is material and relevant to the 
performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is 
causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly &ered; 
(2) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for 
a m d c a l  or other emergency; 
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident; 
or 
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty enforceable under law but for the operation of this Act. 
O GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT DEFINED- For the purposes of h s  Act, the term 'general aviation aircraft' 
means any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness 6 c a t e  has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration, which, at the time such certificate was originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 
20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined 
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under regulations in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 130 1 et seq.) at the time of the accident. 
(d) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS- This section supersedes any State law to the extent that such law permits a 
civil action described in subsection (a) to be brought after the applicable limitation period for such civil action established by 
subsection (a). 
SEC. 3. OTHER DEFINITIONS. 
For purposes of this Act-- 
(1) the term 'aircraft' has the meaning given such term in section 101(5) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 
130 l(5)); 
(2) the term 'airworthiness certificate' means an airworthiness certificate issued under section 6030 of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1423(c)) or under any predecessor Federal statute; 
(3) the term 'limitation period' means 18 years with respect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems, 
subassemblies, and other parts of such aircraft; and 
(4) the term 'type certificate' means a type cdcate issued under section 603(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 
(49 U.S.C. 1423(a)) or under any predecessor Federal statute. 
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF ACT. 
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE- Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
(b) APPLICATION OF ACT- This Act shall not apply with respect to civil actions commenced before the date of the 
enactment of this Act. 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
Vice President of the United States and 
President of the Senate. 
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APPENDIX B 
Legislative - Promess of GARA Throud Conmess (Thomas - U.S. Conmess on the Internet. 1994). 
Senate: 
9/14/93 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce. 
1 1 19/93 Committee on Commerce. Ordered to be reported without amendment favorably. 
1 1/20/93 Committee on Commerce. Reported to Senate without amendment. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar. 
3/9/94 Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. The bill was modified by unanimous consent. Referred to 
the Committee on Judiciary by unanimous consent. Senate Committee on Judiciary discharged. Placed on 
Senate Legislative Calendar. 
3/16/94 Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. Passed Senate as modified without amendment by Yea-Nay 
Vote. 91-8. 
3/17/94 Message on Senate action sent to the House. 
6/29/94 Message on House action received in Senate and at desk: House amendment to Senate bill. 
8/2/94 Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. Amendment SP 2440 agreed to in Senate by voice vote. 
8/3/94 Message on Senate action sent to the House. 
House: 
311 8/94 Referred jointly to the House Committee on Judiciary. 
3/23/94 Referred to the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law. 
611 6/94 Subcommittee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Forward by Subcommittee to Full Committee 
(amended) by voice vote. 
6/2 1/94 Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Ordered to be Reported (amended). 
6/24/94 Reported to House (Amended) by House Committee on Judiciary. 
3/18/94 Referred jointly to the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 
313 1/94 Referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation. 
511 7/94 Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. Ordered to be reported by voice vote. Subcommittee on 
Aviation discharged. 
5/24/94 Reported to House by House Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 
6/24/94 Placed on Union Calendar. 
6/27/94 Called up by House under suspension of the rules. Passed House (amended) by voice vote. 
Executive: 
8/3/94 Cleared for White House. 
8/5/94 Presented to President. 
811 7/94 Signed by President. Became Public Law No: 103-298. 
Alan J. Stolzer holds an M.S. in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a B.S. in Aerospace 
Science from the College of the Ozarks. He is an Associate Dean and a Professor of Aviation Science at Parks College of 
Engineering and Aviation, Saint Louis University. 
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